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Abstract – The tsunami early warning and mitigation systems are typically used to detect the tsunami inundation before the impact so 
that vulnerable communities can be alerted and the damage can be minimized. These systems typically entail upstream and 
downstream processes, starting from the detection of tsunami wave and finishing with safe evacuation of people. There is an interface 
between upstream and downstream mechanisms where the warning is issued and the decision to evacuate people are taken. In 
individual countries, the system by which the information is disseminated from a national point to individual communities varies 
significantly. Due to the complex nature of different administrative systems, it is difficult to understand who takes the decision to 
evacuate, at which point and how is it taken. This paper is the first part of a more extensive study undertaken to understand and 
evaluate the interface between the upstream and downstream mechanisms of the tsunami early warning system. The objective of the 
paper is to present the findings of a literature review conducted as an initial step to the above study and to understand state of the art 
and practices related to the interface of an end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation system. The literature is grouped and analyzed 
using the conceptual analysis method, in order to understand the concepts related to the tsunami early warning system, mainly 
focusing on the issues pertaining to the interface. Through the literature review, a conceptual framework is developed, presenting 
nine concepts and their relationships within the interface. This conceptual framework will serve as a strong theoretical foundation for 
the future steps to be taken under the above study. 
 




After a large number of deaths and massive devastation 
caused by the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami, tsunami 
preparedness has become a significant aspect in the research 
and practice of disaster resilience. A tsunami early warning 
and mitigation system was introduced in the Indian ocean 
region for the first time, and the system became fully 
operational in 2013. These systems typically entail upstream 
and downstream processes.  After the detection of the 
tsunami by the warning center, the regional tsunami service 
provider communicates the warning to the national tsunami 
warning center (NTWC) in each country. This is the 
upstream end of the mechanism. The downstream process 
occurs at the national and local levels in which evacuation 
decision is made, and any subsequent warning is 
disseminated to the community.   
Between these upstream and downstream processes, there 
occurs a phase where the received warning information is 
conveyed through the formal authorities and decision to 
evacuate is taken. This can be termed as the ‘interface.’ In 
individual countries, the systems by which the information is 
disseminated from the national point to individual 
communities vary significantly. Due to the complex nature 
of different administrative systems, it is difficult to 
understand who takes the decision to evacuate, at which 
point, and how is it taken and disseminated to the 
community. The decision can be taken either at the national 
level or regional level before the order for evacuation is 
given to the community. The channels by which the 
information is shared and the structure of hierarchy of 
decision making vary across and within the countries vary 
significantly depending on social, economic, political and 
cultural context. However, it is essential that these factors 
need to be understood for the early warning mechanism to 
work efficiently. Discrepancies of flow of information 
among different countries and also within a country could 
make it difficult for the local and international stakeholders 
to act promptly in an emergency situation, which can 
ultimately put the communities in danger.  
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In order to fill the gap of knowledge and practical tools 
related to the interface of an end-to-end tsunami early 
warning and mitigation system (TEWMS), a study is 
undertaken to aim to understand the technical, legal and 
socio-cultural complexities that occur at the interface 
between upstream and downstream mechanisms of the 
tsunami early warning system.  This interface involves a 
wide array of jurisdictional agencies and response partners, 
including regional tsunami service providers, tsunami 
national contact points, and a range of sub-national 
emergency operations centers and related actors. Using the 
cases of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the study aims to develop 
a framework to understand the nature and operation of the 
interface between the upstream warning and downstream 
threat, and thereby propose a set of practical guidelines for 
better decision making and information dissemination during 
the interface of end-to-end TEWMS in the Indian Ocean 
region. The final guidelines established by the study will 
seek to be a substantial theoretical and practical contribution 
that can be applied across the globe in different types of 
early warning systems related to tsunami preparedness.  
As an initial step for this study, a literature review was 
undertaken to understand state of the art related to the 
interface of an end-to-end TEWMS and to analyze the 
theoretical context pertaining to the early warning systems as 
a whole. The objective of this paper is to present the 
conceptual framework developed through the literature 
review, which will contribute to providing a strong 
theoretical foundation for the broader study. The following 
section describes the methodology used in developing the 
conceptual framework. In section three, the literature related 
to the early warning systems are analyzed to understand the 
main features and requirements, and the interface of the 
early warning system is defined. In section four, the 
conceptual framework is presented, analyzing each concept 
within the framework. The last two sections are allocated for 
conclusion, summary and to describe the future work related 
to the study.  
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
The literature review was conducted using keywords 
related to the interface mechanism. Different groups of 
literature were used for different purposes. Scientific peer-
reviewed journal papers and books were used for theoretical 
knowledge pertaining to the subject, while reports, 
documents by tsunami stakeholders and publications by 
international actors were used for information purposes. In 
order to develop a conceptual framework, the conceptual 
analysis method was used. This method was used by 
Jabareen [1] in developing a conceptual framework for post-
conflict reconstruction. It allows the grouping of concepts 
related to a particular topic and discusses the issues under 
each of these groups. 
A. What is a tsunami early warning system and why?  
Tsunamis are widely known to have caused massive 
destruction of human lives and property in recent years. The 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 affected about 14 countries, 
killing more than 230, 000 people across the globe [2]. After 
the tsunami caused by the earthquake off the Pacific coast of 
Japan in 2011, a number of 15, 429 people were killed, and 
7.781 were reported to be missing [3].  
 Therefore, many efforts have been made by those 
countries exposed to a tsunami threat and the wider 
international community to minimize the impact on 
communities through more effective preparedness and the 
issuing of warnings. Tsunami, early warning systems, are 
recognized as the most effective way of predicting the 
impact of tsunami and issue warnings to people, and thereby 
to minimize the damage [4]. Its prime objective is to alert 
coastal communities about the possibility of the tsunami [5]. 
It typically uses a number of specific institutions to provide 
timely and adequate information, so that the communities 
can take actions to reduce the risk and prepare to respond [6]. 
Some of the mandatory requirements of tsunami early 
warning system include fast prediction, active alarm, reliable 
response, secure communication, coherency and consistency  
[4, 7, 8]. The implementation and operation of an early 
warning system require the knowledge of both natural and 
social sciences and involves theoretical and practical 
properties [9]. According to United Nations international 
strategy for disaster reduction (UNISDR), any hazard 
warning system includes four interactive elements, namely 
risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, 
dissemination and communication, and response 
capability[10, 11]. Basher [7] claims that monitoring and 
warning is the most prominent part of the system, while the 
failures in the system commonly occur in the preparedness 
and communication.   
B. End-to-end tsunami early warning and mitigation 
system  
A tsunami early warning system not only includes the 
technical aspect, where the possibility of an earthquake is 
predicted using scientific tools, but also human and social 
components related to decision making and human responses. 
This process starts with the detection of the earthquake and 
extends to the evacuation of people and their safe return to 
homes [11].  This is called an end-to-end tsunami early 
warning and mitigation system, which has components 
within the geographical limits of the country and beyond, 
and therefore, involves local and regional institutions for its 
smooth operation [5]. Due to its complexity, the end-to-end 
TEWMS is traditionally divided into two by the academics 
and practitioners as upstream and downstream phases. The 
upstream includes detection of the wave, verification, threat 
evaluation, and forecasting. After the warning is 
disseminated and the decision to evacuate people is taken, 
the downstream mechanism takes place including delivery of 
public safety messages, initiate national counter-measures 
and prepare and implement standardized operation [5, 12].  
C. The interface of an end-to-end TEWMS 
The distinction between the upstream and downstream is 
made evident in most of documented studies and reports, by 
clearly defining the actors and procedures. The monitoring 
and detection take place in the upstream, and the information 
dissemination and evacuation in the downstream. However, 
the means and the roles connecting the upstream and 
downstream mechanisms are not clearly defined, both in 
theory and practice. The decision to issue the warning and 
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the decision to evacuate the people takes place between 
these two mechanisms. This is where the interface of the 
warning system occurs.  Those actors and institutions 
involved in the interface mechanism vary significantly from 
country to country, as well as within a single country. Figure 





Fig.  1 Tsunami warning chain, adapted from IOC/UNESCO [5] 
 
Once the regional tsunami service provider (TSP) detects 
a tsunami threat, a warning is sent to the national tsunami 
warning center (NTWC). It is usually analyzed within the 
NTWC to decide the size of local threat and the volume of 
the affected community, before sending the warning 
information to national disaster management organization 
(NDMO). The role of NDMO and its responsibilities vary 
widely depending on the geographic and demographic 
factors. In some countries, the warning is sent to local 
authorities, people and media directly by the NDMO, 
whereas in some others it is sent to another local authority 
for further decision making. Whether the decision for 
evacuation is taken either at the national level or at the local 
level, in most cases, it is unclear who bares the ultimate 
responsibility of pressing the button for evacuation. This 
decision-making mechanism is taking place during the 
interface that occurs between the upstream and downstream 
processes.  However, the starting and finishing points of the 
interface in the end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation 
system are not clear. Nevertheless, it is clear that warning 
dissemination and evacuation decision happens during this 
phase. Therefore, a working definition for the interface of 
end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation systems is 
described in the following section.   
D. Working definition for the interface; 
The interface is where the warning is received by the 
national focal point and processed, and the decision to 
evacuation is taken before disseminating it to the public and 
involves the three principal actions of issuing the warning, 
conveying the warning and ordering for evacuation.  
 
 
Fig. 2 The position of the interface within the end-to-end TEWMS, authors’ 
composition  
 
Although these terms related to warning and evacuation 
have been mentioned in research and practice, they are not 
analyzed in the context of interface and related to decision 
making when faced with a tsunami threat. Researchers that 
focus on tsunami warning tend to deal with technical aspects, 
and less so on human interventions. On the other hand, 
research on evacuation decision making tends to focus on 
the downstream mechanism. It is necessary to understand the 
terminology and the specific issues related to the interface of 
the warning system. In the following section, a conceptual 
framework is presented to understand the key elements and 
issues within the end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation 
system, that is specifically relevant for the interface 
mechanism.  
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Decision-making mechanisms 
Platt [13] presents a typology of decision making related 
to disasters, as meta-decisions, operational decisions, and 
planning decisions. Meta-decisions taken by the gov’t in 
disaster situations are associated with authority and 
governance as well as speed and deliberation, both 
applicable in the interface. The governance structure of a 
country influences the way in which the decisions are taken, 
and the information is disseminated in different countries. In 
Japan, the meteorological agency issues the warning to the 
public and the media units at the district level [14]. In 
Indonesia, after the national authority issue the warning, it is 
up to the local mayor to order for evacuation [15]. At the 
same time, fast and effective decision making is required in 
case of tsunami inundation, and the failure to do so will 
leave the communities at risk [16].  
According to Rosenthal and Kouzmin [17], government 
decisions in unexpected events are based on 5 dimensions;  
scale, official response, government style, response strategy, 
and timing. These dimensions become highly significant 
with respect to the interface. The decision making in the 
interface will be affected by the size of the disaster and, thus 
the geopolitical borders of the vulnerable community, by 
whether the decision to evacuate can be taken nationally or 
locally, the level of openness of the government, and the 
capacity to act deliberately.  
 
• Detection of tsunami
• Send the warning to 
national point
Receive the warning by 
national point
Upstream
• Issuing the warning
• Conveying the warning 
Ordering for evcuation 
Interface
• Publicise the evcuation 
for order
• Evacuation of people 
Downstream 
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B. Clearly defined actors 
In order for any mechanism to work effectively, 
individuals and institutions involved should have a clear idea 
of their roles and responsibilities. An integrated approach to 
early warning should be inclusive of the actors that are not 
typically recognized as part of the system, especially those in 
political and administrative roles, as well as community 
leaders [7]. As shown in figure 1, there are a number of 
prominent actors in an end-to-end TEWMS. However, their 
role during the interface varies depending on the country’s 
geographic, demographic and socio-cultural background [18]. 
For example, in Thailand, once a threat is predicted by the 
meteorological department, the national disaster warning 
center (NDWC) and the public relations department are 
sending the early warning, which operates respectively under 
the ministry of information and communication technology 
and the office of the prime minister. The warning message is 
then sent to provincial and local authorities for evacuation 
and response [19]. In Timor Leste, the information from the 
national point is sent in 2 ways. The national disaster 
operation center (NDMO) evaluates the threat and issue the 
warning to the public while sending the warning information 
to national disaster management doctorate (NDMD) for 
further action [20].  
A study by InterWorks [21] reveals that NDMO can be 
located in different organizations or ministries under 
different names, and their responsibilities may vary 
according to local needs. In some countries, the NDMOs are 
common for all disasters, and the responsibility of warning 
and evacuation is spread among different institutions. The 
methods of dealing with disasters vary within the countries 
in some instances, based on local practices [21]. While 
warning and evacuation can be under a single unit or in 
different units depending on the country situation, in most 
cases the local or provincial warning units and their roles 
within the early warning system are not clearly defined. In 
Indonesia, the major issues the final warning to the public at 
the local level, but in some cases, there were conflicts 
between LDMO and the mayor  [15].  
C. The centralized vs. decentralized approach 
Kapucu and Garayev [22] argue that traditional 
approaches to disaster risk reduction have increasingly 
become ineffective, and thus the hierarchical and centralized 
approaches should be replaced by decentralization. The risk 
reduction, which is traditionally being understood as a 
primary responsibility of the government is increasingly 
getting the local governments and well as the private sector 
to share the risk and take actions [23]. However, the 
interface involves crucial decisions of issuing the warning, 
conveying the warning to national and local authorities, and 
ordering for evacuation of people. These decisions must be 
taken by those who have enough knowledge as well as the 
sufficient authority, and those individuals or institutions can 
be held accountable for the information and orders 
dispatched by them. Samarajiva [24] highlights disaster 
warning as a ‘core business of the government.’  Typically, 
the warning and preparedness are more centrally operated 
while the local governments focus more on relief and 
reconstruction [21]. According to de León, et al. [11], 
monitoring and forecasting can be either centrally operated 
by a national organization, or decentralized among local 
agents to carry out their own warning and evacuation 
programmes. Although a decentralized approach is useful in 
the evacuation and response process, de León et al. [11] adds 
that it may use less sophisticated technology that could result 
in imprecise  information. The extent of centralization in 
taking the decisions for warning and evacuation largely 
depends on the geopolitical and demographic factors. In Sri 
Lanka, the warning and evacuation decision is principally 
taken by NDMO, and disseminated to local authorities for 
further action [25]. On the contrary, in Indonesia, the 
national warning is further evaluated for the local impact 
based on the official guidelines and the local mayor is 
issuing the official warning [26].  
D. Standardization of interface 
The national and local institutions usually follow standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) related to the bulletins or 
advice regarding the warning [27]. An SOP describes the 
procedures agreed on by relevant stakeholder institutions on 
coordinating who, what, when, where and how for tsunami 
early warning and response [28]. Ideally, each actor involved 
in the interface should have their own SOPs to deal with the 
emergency situation. Although SOPs for TEWMS as a 
whole, are clearly defined for most of the countries, it is not 
clear which of these apply specifically for the interface. The 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) 
encourages individual countries to develop and maintain 
SOPs at all levels of decision making in TEWMS [18]. On 
the other hand, while the SOPs are mostly developed for 
national level disaster institutions, they are not clearly 
defined for local level authorities, as well as other 
departments involved in the decision-making process. In 
countries where there are fewer occurrences of tsunami 
(Pakistan, Timor Leste) SOPs are available only for the 
public warning and disaster management institutions [20, 29]. 
In Sri Lanka, although there are several guidelines and SOPs 
at the national and department level, they are not clearly 
integrated into a single work plan for smooth operation [25]. 
At the same time, the SOPs for local governments are not 
clearly defined in the case of Sri Lanka.  
As described by Steinmetz, et al. [30], decision support 
system (DSS) is an innovative approach to provide 
operational guidelines at all stakeholder levels. It uses the 
knowledge from several disciplines to support the decision 
of warning and evacuation for the local officers and is 
currently used by several countries. However, this system is 
heavily reliant on technology for information dissemination, 
which could act as a barrier in cases of technical failures.  
E. Technical capacity 
It is evident that technology plays a vital role in the 
TEWMS, and the decision-making power during the 
interface, both at the national and local levels, is 
significantly affected by the technical capacity of the 
relevant country or organization. This includes the capacity 
to analyze the national and local impact of tsunami 
inundation, as well as the reliable methods of fast and 
precise communication systems. As claimed by Bernard and 
Titov [12], the technology of each country facing tsunami 
has improved in relation to the tsunami destruction over the 
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years, rather than to the predicted tsunami risk.  It also 
depends on the financial capacity and economic 
development level of a country and could also be a result of 
socio-political influences. TEWS cannot afford to fail during 
an emergency since it carries a large responsibility to 
provide reliable information [31].  However, several cases of 
technological failures were recorded during recent tsunami 
inundations. Indonesia, in partnership with the German 
government, has primarily invested in developing the 
national and local technical capacity to strengthen the core 
elements of the early warning system [26]. This system 
works very efficiently in giving decision guidance to local 
officers and timely warnings to people. Nevertheless, a few 
problems were reported when the national warning center 
failed to issue the warning due to technical failures in alarms 
and warning buoys [15]. On the other hand, the local 
institutions in developing countries are not adequately 
equipped with technology to measure the magnitude and the 
timing of the local impact, and much work need to be done 
in this regard [11].  
F. Human capacity  
The human factor plays a significant role in a people-
centered approach to risk reduction in case of natural 
hazards [32]. de León, et al. [11] highlights that the link 
between the technical aspect of warning and the capacity of 
human response is weak in most developing countries. The 
disaster management organizations and community 
organizations lack the ability to respond rapidly. Insufficient 
organizational capacity and  inadequate preparedness for 
emergency response are two critical reasons for failures in 
the operation of TEWMS [22]. Therefore, it is necessary to 
review and revise the traditional responsibilities assigned to 
each role, focusing on collaboration and solution-based 
approaches. The problems in issuing the warning, which is a 
central component of the interface, could also be a result of 
human failures  [15]. In cases, where critical decisions of 
warning and evacuation are taken by local officials, they 
need to be equipped with adequate scientific knowledge, 
training, technical staff and up-to-date information [33].  
G. Spatial and socio-cultural 
An effective early warning system requires the risk 
reduction to be mainstreamed into public policy and include 
community participation as  a part of its strategy [34]. 
Including tsunami mitigation in education has become more 
common, and in some cases mandatory, in order to target a 
large number of vulnerable communities and to build a 
culture of awareness [35]. At the same time, hazard maps are 
useful tools for designing evacuation planning and ensuring 
safety in case of a tsunami threat [36]. Hazard mapping is a 
crucial element in hazard assessment and mitigation and 
empowers the local communities to act according to their 
own requirements [37]. In a paper presenting the tsunami 
hazard mapping in Padang, Indonesia, the authors reiterate 
the need to map the tsunami hazard at the local community 
level, while accounting for microscopic temporal and spatial 
dynamics of the tsunami inundation [38]. Indigenous 
knowledge and socio-cultural features play a significant role 
in decision making during disasters in individual 
communities, and thus community-based disaster 
management tools can be used for risk reduction [39]. The 
cultural values, practices, and beliefs affect the people’s 
capacity to believe in the risk of tsunami threat. Cultural 
differences including language and religion also condition 
them to evaluate the tsunami risk in certain ways and affect 
their emotional response [40].  
H. Vertical and horizontal coordination 
Stakeholder coordination is essential for hazard risk 
assessment, warning, and mitigation in case of tsunami 
inundation. The various institutions bring together their 
capacities for the common objective of providing safety to 
people [41]. Scientific institutions should coordinate 
effectively with national warning center and the disaster 
management organizations, together with civil society, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other government 
bodies and media outlets [42]. As the early warning systems 
developed through time, one of the major issues encountered 
by the practitioners is the problems of coordination and 
understanding between national and local actors, as well as 
among different national institutions.  As a result of a lack of 
coordination, communities can be misguided and may also 
face problems of discrimination [8]. Historically, there were 
problems of coordinating between national and local 
governments, due to personal agendas, perceptions, and 
priorities. In some countries, there is a lack of understanding 
about the central objectives and strategies [21]. In all cases 
of recent natural disasters and extreme events, collaborative 
management of the emergency situation has proved to be 
essential [43]. Moreover, the participation of many 
stakeholders in a single mechanism, primarily related to 
decision making, can cause difficulties unless the 
coordination is effective and systematic. Defining clear roles 
and responsibilities for institutions, as well as capacity 
building within and among the organizations, is necessary to 
overcome these problems [22]. It is necessary to empower 
the national level institutions to organize and coordinate 
effectively with each other, and this should be a prior 
demand of the core national point of tsunami risk reduction. 
On the other hand, the communities can feedback to the 
preparedness plan through their local organizations, which 
link the public response with the national level organizations 
[41].  
I. Formal and informal communication mechanisms 
The primary functions of an end-to-end TEWMS are the 
timely and accurate communication of tsunami inundation to 
the public [24].  In the case of interface, the communication 
between the organizations is also critical. The significance of 
effective communication in emergency situations is 
highlighted in research since the robust connection between 
these organizations increases the reliability and accuracy of 
information passed down to the public [44]. On the other 
hand, failures to communicate accurately and effectively can 
cause irreparable damages.  In the case of September 2007 
tsunami in Padang, Indonesia, about a quarter of the affected 
population did not receive the warning due to ineffectiveness 
in the media. While informal warnings were given through 
certain media outlets, the nature of warning and its 
interpretation differed from one channel to the other. This 
has resulted in people doubting the reliability of warning 
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information given through the media [41]. Mobile, internet 
and social media have become increasingly useful in 
collaborating among different stakeholders as well as in 
communicating the warning information to the public [45]. 
The social media is increasingly used by government 
organizations to communicate the warnings to the public. 
However, the unprecedented and uncontrolled information in 
social media can also cause spreading of misinformation. 
However, some researchers suggest that despite the 
spreading of fabrication, these channels promise to be the 
most effective and leading information disseminating tool in 
tsunami warnings in the future [46].  
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
In an effort to understand the interface of an end-to-end 
TEWMS, a conceptual framework consisting of nine key 
elements was developed using the existing literature and 
other information sources. These elements are related to the 
necessary principal actions that take place during the 
interface; issuing the warning, conveying the warning and 
ordering for evacuation. Started from the decision-making 
mechanism, some of the key features and issues related to 
tsunami warning and interface were identified, including 
diverse decision-making mechanisms, hierarchical structures, 
and political and administrative factors. It is essential to have 
a clearly defined set of actors who operate within the 
interface, and there are several confusions and disparities 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of these actors. 
Depending on geographic, demographic and political 
circumstances the issue of warning and order for evacuation 
within a country can be either centralized by the government 
or decentralized across local governments and other relevant 
institutions. In terms of standardization, international 
organizations highlight the need for the availability of clear 
SOPs for all national and local stakeholders. Having clear 
guidelines reduces the confusion and facilitates the speedy 
and accurate delivery of information to the public. The 
technical and human capacity within the organizations 
involved in the interface of end-to-end TEWMS affects the 
decision-making power of those actors. It is necessary to 
equip the key organization with the up-to-date technology, 
adequate trained staff and access to scientific knowledge. 
Tools such as education, indigenous knowledge, cultural 
inclusion, and hazard mapping can be used to mainstream 
the tsunami preparedness and mitigation, and to increase 
community participation in key decision-making. The 
effective vertical and horizontal coordination among the 
national and local actors can contribute to accurate and 
deliberate warning dissemination, and thus it becomes a 
decisive element during the interface. This should be 
followed by a well-organized communication mechanism to 
facilitate collaboration among different institutions. While 
formal and informal methods of communication are used in 
TEWS, both of which have their own advantages and 
disadvantages, there is an increasing trend to use social 
media for information dissemination. 
The conceptual framework will inform further empirical 
studies into the interface of end-to-end TEWMS in different 
countries. Guidelines are being established to conduct 
interviews and focus group discussions taking place under 
the two case studies conducted in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. 
Given the ever-present threat of a Tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean region, the establishment and maintenance of a fully 
functional TEWMS in each of the countries in terms of both 
the required human and technical capacities, in the long run, 
is a necessity. Yet, such a system cannot exist independent 
of the economic, political, cultural and social realities in the 
countries concerned. It is in this sense that the case studies 
currently underway in Indonesia and Sri Lanka promise to 
identify and understand the challenges in order to develop 
and refine the conceptual framework further so that 
appropriate recommendations can be made to streamline the 
TEWMS at national and local levels with a particular focus 
on the interface being the two levels. The above framework 
will be continuously improved and modified throughout the 
data collection process and will be used as a guideline for 
data analysis.  
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